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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
permanent home and go into business there after the war. An exhaustive dissent points
out that the rigid requirements set up in this decision in effect deny a military man the
right to change his domicile. Wilson v. Wilson, Tex. Civ. App., 189 S.W. 2d 212
(1945), overruled a finding of domicile by the trial court on similar facts, pointing out
that final intent as to domicile will actually be determined by opportunities yet to be
offered. To the same effect, see the interesting dissent to Hawkins v. Winstead, 65
Idaho 12, 138 P. 2d 972, 975 (1943). On the same facts, other courts will find domi-
ciliary intent as readily as the Sasse case. E.g., Clark v. Clark, 71 Ariz. 194, 225 P. 2d
486 (1950) ; St. John v. St. John, 291 Ky. 363, 163 S.W. 2d 820 (1942). Often, there are
other factors showing the intent. E.g., Kankelborg v. Kankelborg, supra (registration
and voting) ; West v. West, 35 Haw. 461 (1940) (change of home address on service
records) ; Burgan v. Burgan, 207 La. 1057, 22 So. 2d 649 (1945) (marriage within the
jurisdiction). Even contributions to the community chest have been considered.
Strubble v. Strubble, Tex. Civ. App., 177 S.W. 2d 279 (1943).
Unless otherwise provided by statute, cf. Blouin v. Blouin, 67 Nev. 314, 218 P. 2d
937 (1950), bodily presence in the jurisdiction for the entire statutory period is not
essential to divorce jurisdiction, provided the domiciliary intent remains constant.
Summerville v. Summerville, 31 Wash. 411, 72 Pac. 84 (1903). In the Summerville
case, P left her child in the state while gone. The rule has been stated that if, when
a person leaves a jurisdiction, no vestige of residence remains-as in the Sasse case-
"intention alone cannot retain a residence." Turner v. Turner, 87 Vt. 65, 88 Atl. 3, 4
(1913). This proposition is inconsistent with the general rule that a domicile, once
established, remains the same until a contrary intention is shown. Spielman v. Spiel-
man, 144 Wash. 421, 258 Pac. 37 (1927) ; Polk v. Polk, 158 Wash. 242, 290 Pac. 861
(1930) ; Kankelborg v. Kankelborg, supra. Continued actual residence is not an element
of domicile, and is relevant only in the determination of intent. The misleading propo-
sition of the Turner case, as preserved in 17 Am. JuR, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, § 251
(1938), has nominally survived to confuse the decisions. E.g., Campbell v. Campbell,
• - Fla. .. ., 57 So. 2d 34 (1952). The Sasse case, as have practically all decisions,
ignores it.
HuGH MCGOUGH
Personal Injuries: Unemancipated Child Given Cause of Action Against Parent
Negligent in Non-parental Act. A partner in a common carrier partnership, while
driving a partnership vehicle on business, negligently injured his minor son who was
playing in the street. The child, P, through his guardian ad litem sues the partner-
ship for personal injuries. D's demurrer sustained. Held: reversed (7 to 2), Borst
v. Borst, 141 Wash. Dec. 598, 251 P. 2d 149 (1952).
The point brought to issue was whether an unemancipated minor has a cause of
action against his parent for personal injuries negligently caused. The court reviews
the traditional reasons for denying a cause of action and demonstrates their inadequacy.
The reasons (which suffer an uninspired repetition in the cases and the authorities)
and the court's comments thereon may be summarized. (1) The maintenance of family
tranquillity. The possibility of such a disturbance is a matter of fact, not law. "In
the comparatively rare cases where a child brings such an action, the likelihood is
that the peace of the home has already been disturbed beyond repair, or that, because
cf the existing circumstances, the suit will not disturb existing tranquillity."
(2) The desire not to undermine parental authority and discipline. The scope of
parental discipline is subject to delineation in civil suits as it is in criminal actions.
(3) The maintenance of an equitable distribution of the family exchequer. The appor-
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tionment of the family assets and income is almost within the discretion of the parent.
Under certain circumstances the award of damages in a suit of child against parent may
augment the total, and in any case is just as likely to rebalance as to unbalance the
distribution. (4) The prevention of possible collusion and fraud. The righteous should
not suffer for the guilty. "Courts must depend on the efficacy of the judicial processes
to ferret out the meritorious from the fraudulent in particular cases." If that fails
the legislature can act. (5) An analogy to the husband-wife immunity. The analogy
is broken by the absence of, the legal identity between parent and child which exists
between spouses. (6) Other arguments that have more rhetoric than reason are
that the parent might inherit the money recovered by the child, that the child would
otherwise be permitted to bring a "stale" action after reaching majority, and the
argument based on the obsolete concept of the family as being a governmental unit',
with the parent in loco regis.
For nearly half a century the law in Washington has been set by the decision in
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905), a suit by a minor daughter who
was raped by her father. Most of these traditional reasons were relied on to deny
recovery although the injury was patently intentional, all semblances of the parental
relationship were extinguished and the Fifth -Commandment was reduced to nonsense.
In the Borst case the court shelves this sophistry and "draws the Thing as he sees
It for the God of Things as They Are I"
Liability insurance is a condition precedent to the granting of a common carrier
permit by the Washington Public Service Commisson, RCW 81.80.190 [RRS 6382-16],
so presumably an insurer was the real party defendant. Recovery against a negligent
parent indemnified by a policy of insurance was allowed in Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17,
166 S.E. 538 (1932) where the court remarked, "when the reason for a rule ceases
the rule itself ceases ... This action is not unfriendly as between the daughter and
the father ... In fact their interests unite in favor of her recovery, but without
hint of 'domestic fraud and collusion' (charged in some cases) ... No strained family
relations will follow."
The principal case predicates the erasure of the parent's immunity on the injury
occuring to the minor during execution of other than a parental duty. "The fact
that the child on the public street was respondent's son added nothing to the father's
duties or difficulties in operating the business vehicles. For all practical purposes the
relation between the two at the time of the accident was not parent and child
but driver and pedestrian." Similar "rationale appears in opinions from other juris-
dictions, Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930) (father and son as
employer and employee) ; Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. 2d 743 (1952)
(father and son in business relationship). However, the Borst parent was engaged
in earning the family livelihood which would seem to be pointedly within, the parental
duty, and in this respect counsel will doubtless experience some difficulty in adumb-
rating the exact scope of the rule of the case.
Generally the result would seem to be reasonable and salutory. It is well in
accord with the current trend to use industry (or the insurers) as the means for
spreading the load imposed on individuals suffering injury or loss caused by modem
technical equipment or products. If the legislators decide that the evils of possible
collusion out-weigh the merits of this load-spreading, the way is always open to
deal with the situation in the way the Washington Guest Statute met a parallel problem.
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